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Since President Nixon's historic visit to the People's
Republic of China in February 1972 a stream of Western visitors
has gone to Peking and returned to report on Chinese views
concerning such international topics as the Sino-Soviet dispute
and Taiwan and such internal topics as education policies and
medicine. While these visitors have talked with officials of
the Party and state up to the highest levels of officialdom,
the most fascinating and perhaps most crucial topic remains
almost totally a mystery to all outsiders. That is the
question of what direction China will take when Chairman Mao
Tse-tung leaves the political scene, which he soon must, and
who will provide that direction. Most immediate is the
question of who will determine the selection of Mao's successor
or successors, that is, who holds power in China today.
While no China scholar of any competence is willing to
risk his reputation by taking a definitive stand on who might
win any struggle for power in China or what this might mean in
terms of China's relations with other countries, it is
generally recognized that there are a number of major sources
of political power in China. The major ones are believed to be
the Party, the professional administrators of the state, the
leaders of mass organizations (identified as the "radicals")
and the military. It is the latter power base which would seem
the most powerful in terms of stability and ability to make its
interests heard by means of its power for coercion. And it is

2also the military - the People's Liberation Army - which
remains the most anonymous to those outsiders referred to
earlier.
As with any largely unknown quantity, it is easy to
overestimate or underestimate or to misunderstand completely
the role that the army plays in China today. To Americans
familiar with the restricted internal role of the American
armed forces, the role of the military in China is particularly
curious and unfamiliar. For both the philosophy of the system
and the reality of conditions through the 24 years of the
existence of the People's Republic have contributed to a unique
inter-relationship of military, government and political party.
While the army's influence and activism have fluctuated in the
years since 1949 both as to direction and enthusiasm, it has
played a major role in China's internal affairs. And it is
fair to say that the army will play a role in determining
China's future internal direction.
It should hardly be needed to add that with China
increasingly showing signs of moving from her traditional
inwardlooking perspective to becoming a participating power in
world politics, it is increasingly important for the student of
foreign affairs to understand and appreciate the unique role of
the military in the government and politics of mainland China.
It is the purpose of this paper to study this unique
relationship. While doing so, a number of themes will appear
which are central to an understanding of the role of the
military in China. These themes are:

3The influence of Mao Tse-tung's philosophy on the
course of the military since the revolution and its
application and relevance to post-revolutionary China.
The extent of the role and influence of military
officers in government and politics and the extent to
which their military position and background
(training) affects their role and influence.
The loyalties and priorities that military officers
have developed and the way in which these loyalties
and priorities have affected their response to past
crises (the Cultural Revolution in particular) and may
affect their response in the future.
These themes will be explored in a review of the
military's role during the 1950s when Marshal Peng Te-huai and
professionals dominated the army, during the early 1960s when
Lin Piao served as leader and example of a politicized
military, during the crises of the Cultural Revolution of
1965-1969 and in the present post-Cultural Revolution period.
And the roles of the two dominant military leaders in China
since the revolution - Defense Ministers Peng and Lin whose
careers serve as examples of the difficulties inherent in the
role of military men involved in government and politics - will
be studied. But first it is necessary to examine the philos-
ophy which molded the Chinese military and has guided it
through the nation's first two decades and more - that of
Mao Tse-tung.

MAO'S PHILOSOPHY ON THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY
"Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun," is,
perhaps, Mao Tse-tung's best known quotation in the West. As
it applies to the modern Chinese army, however, it is not
sufficient to view the military's role as that of a simple
instrument of a political party. In China during the post
revolutionary period, Mao has attempted to fashion the army
into the repository of the ethos of struggle and sacrifice
which he views as the mark of every true revolutionary
movement. The army combines naturally the traits of discipline
and initiative which Mao admires and seeks to instill in all of
China's society. Thus it has been Mao's goal to make the army
the vanguard force of the continuing revolutionary struggle
which he envisions in China.
Since 1919 the leaders of the People's Republic, with
varying degrees of enthusiasm and success, have tried to apply
this philosophy of Mao's on the role of the military. They
have attempted to build a modernized army capable of defending
China in a modern world while at the same time ensuring that
the army maintained its revolutionary character. This they have
attempted to do through the application of Mao's theories to
specific military missions and problems.
To appreciate the difficulty and delicacy of this task
it is necessary to appreciate the special qualities of Mao's
views on the role of the military. First, Mao's theories were
almost without exception formulated prior to the establishment

5of the People's Republic during the years when the Chinese
Communists' Red Army was an outlaw revolutionary force. And,
second, Mao's theories reflect a unique combination of the
Communist ideology of Marx and Lenin as interpreted by Mao, of
Mao's experiences with the Chinese Communist Party and Red
Army as they struggled through the pre-revolution years and of
the complex personality of Mao Tse-tung.
Analysis of Mao's personal make-up is unfortunately too
often biased by political considerations or blurred by gaps of
information. Official Chinese biographies of Mao are political
instruments used by the state to instruct rather than to
inform. Mao's life - his personal qualities - are intended to
serve as examples to earnest young Chinese Communists.
Consequently, in the Chinese view a deep analysis is not
essential. Western biographers suffer from a lack of reliable
information concerning Mao and a lack of personal contact with
him. Some of these sources also lack the cool objectivity from
which such a controversial subject could benefit.
Nonetheless, certain qualities of Mao's personality seem
clearly to have effected his attitudes and these qualities seem
to have their basis in what little is known of Mao's early
formative years. Vigorous nationalism and a belief that
nothing could be accomplished without struggle, continuous
struggle, seem to be the essence - the foundation - upon which
Mao has built his ideas. And these qualities seem to be the
foundation of his attitude toward the military arts.
Very early in Mao's formative years he became aware of

6the importance and effect that the use of force could have in
effecting change. At the age of eighteen he had participated
for six months in the army which helped to overthrow the Manchu
dynasty in 1911. At the same time, Mao's views were being
shaped by the intellectual currents surrounding him in the
first decades of the twentieth century in China. In addition
to the revolution and the discussion it stirred, Mao, like other
young Chinese of the educated class, was exposed to literature
which had a martial theme and which portrayed military men as
heroes and defenders or leaders of good causes. Two of the
stories which Mao is known to have read and been impressed by -
for he often quoted from them in later years - were Romance of
the Three Kingdoms whose hero is a warrior- statesman, and Water
Margin a story of heroic bandits who struck at the rich and
helped the poor. Mao was so impressed with the importance of
the martial spirit that his very first published writing, a
discussion of the need for physical education in the schools,
has as its theme the need for physical education in order to
3
enhance military heroism.
One of Mao's most thoughtful and thorough Western
biographers, Stuart Schram, who often refers to Mao's military
1 Stuart Schram, The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung





7romanticism, says that Mao since his youth has regarded war as
the supreme adventure and the supreme test of human courage and
human will. Mao, Schram concludes, has always been (and still
is) "basically, a romantic in search of adventure."
Despite the impact of historical events and intellectual
ideas upon the youthful Mao, Mao's theories did not spring
full-blown from his brain sometime around 1920 to be handed
down ever after as irreversible truths as some of his admirers
in Peking today would have the world believe. Mao's ideas
were formulated and modified over the course of the Communist
revolutionary struggle in China and the effect of the experi-
ence heavily influenced Mao. His writing on the role of the
military in China began after the formation of the Red Army in
1927 and primarily reflects Mao's experiences as the co-leader
of that army (with Chu Teh).
It was during these formative years of the Red Army, for
example, that Mao developed most of his concepts on the rela-
tionship between the army and the people. At the time of its
founding, the Red Army was hardly more than a fugitive band
hiding out in the mountains of south China, dependent upon the
local peasants for food, clothing and concealment. Mao learned
from experience that the success of the army depended upon the
goodwill of the people and the goodwill of the people would
depend upon good relations between the army and the peasants.






8disciplines" and "eight point rules" emphasizing absolute
discipline, correctness and kindness in the soldiers' dealing
with the people.
However, the most significant lesson which Mao would
seem to have learned and learned early on in his experiences
with the Red Army and the Communist Party was that political
power does indeed "come from the barrel of a gun." Until the
formation of the Red Army the Chinese Communists were literally
fugitives on the run and hopelessly ineffective. It was only
after an army had been formed that the Party acquired any
status and authority with either the peasants or the author-
ities. Only then did the Party attract members in large
numbers and begin to control areas of the country. Only when
it acquired a gun did the Party begin to experience success.
It is clear however, that Mao's military theories are
also bound up in his social theories. And these in turn were
formed by his exposure to the works of Marx and Lenin which he
first became familiar with as a young librarian at Peking
University. Mao was an avid student of the two Communist
philosophers. And he conscientiously attempted to apply their
theories as they became known to him. But Mao had never
ventured outside China (and did not do so until after the
James Pinckney Harrison, The Long March to Power: A
History of the Chinese Communist Party, 1921-1972 (New York:





9establishment of the People's Republic and until well after most
of his theories had already been formulated). Consequently he
viewed the ideas of Marx and Lenin through the prism of his
homeland, its strengths and weaknesses, and particularly its
peasant stock. This has led to what is referred to as a
sinification of Marxism- Leninism, an interpretation of Marx and
Lenin's principle in light of the special circumstances found
in China.
Two of the Marxist principles which particularly
appealed to Mao and which he adapted to China's circumstances -
and which it should be added were particularly suited to the
Chinese situation - were the concepts of "mass line" and the
"single class." Mao has considered these qualities to be
essential to any effective military force and China's military
leaders have dutifully espoused them up to the present day.
They have fostered certain fundamental military policies such
as the need for politics to be in "command" of the army and the
desirability of a proletarian-class army.
But perhaps most interesting of all, the very prominence
which the army held in the Chinese Communist system, Mao
attributes to Marxist doctrine. "According to the Marxist
theory of the state, the army is the chief component of state
James D. Jordan, "The Maoist vs. The Professional Vision
of a People's Army," in William W. Whitson, ed., The Military
and Political Power in China in the 1970s (New York: Praeger




power," Mao concluded as early as 1938. And as late as 1969,
China's Defense Minister still echoed that Maoist interpre-
tation of Marxism. "Chairman Mao has pointed out many times,"
Lin Piao reminded the Party's Ninth Congress in 1969, "from the
Marxist point of view the main component of the state is the
„9
army.
Mao's theories on the role of the military in Chinese
society, then, reflect the many influences upon him - chief of
which were his personal qualities, his experiences and the
Marxist-Leninist philosophy he admired. Mao proceded during
the long struggle to power to put his ideas into writing. As
pointed out earlier, almost all of Mao's philosophy was set
into writing well before the People's Republic was established
in 1949 - certainly all of Mao's most significant work to date
was produced before the revolution. But while the Red Army of
the revolutionary years was renamed after establishment of the
Republic, the army remained in terms of Mao's philosophy a
revolutionary army just as China was to remain, Mao hoped, a
revolutionary society.
The success of Mao in applying his theories has waxed
and waned in the past 24 years. Their very assertion, however,
is often a tip-off to the prevailing attitudes and problems
o
Mao Tse-tung, "Problems of War and Strategy," Selected




within the military and the Party concerning the proper role of
the army in society. Examples of major Maoists theories on the
role of the military and the post revolutionary setting in
which they have been asserted will illustrate this point and
will, it is hoped, give greater clarity to the later discussion
of the role of the military in government and politics.
Maoist doctrine on the economic, cultural and educational
responsibilities of the army was formulated during the wars
against the Japanese and the Nationalists. It was again made
prominent during the Great Leap Forward period of the 1950s
when the army was directed to participate in non-military work.
The old slogans of "an army of labor," "a cultural army" and an
"educational army" were promoted in newspapers, radio broadcasts
and speeches to the armed forces. Mao's 1949 essay Turn the
Army into a Working Force was again widely quoted. "The army
is not only a fighting force, it is mainly a working force,"
Mao had said.
. . . all army cadres should be good at leading workers
and organizing the trade unions, good at mobilizing and
organizing the youth, good at managing industry and
commerce, good at running schools, good at solving the
problems of food, coal and other daily necessities and
good at handling monetary and other financial
problems. . . .J-0
The 1950s also saw an effort to build a strong militia
within the PLA and this plan, too, had its roots deep in
Mao Tse-tung's revolutionary period theories. In his article
On Coalition Government
,
which Mao wrote in 1945, he advanced
Mao Tse-tung, "Turn the Army into a Working Force,"




the importance of the militia: "... this army is powerful
because it has the people's self-defense corps and the militia -
the vast organization of the masses - fighting in coordination
with it.
These philosophies which stressed the overriding
importance of the human element over weapons met with resistance
within the PLA in the 1950s as they apparently had years earlier
within the Red Army. But Mao was adamant. His philosophy on
the superiority of man was firmly stated as early as 1938:
. . . the so-called theory that weapons decide every-
thing . . . constitutes a mechanical approach to the
question of war and a subjective and one sided view.
Our view is to oppose this; we see not only weapons but
also people. Weapons are an important factor in war
but not the decisive factor; it is people, not things
that are decisive. The contest of strength is not only
a contest of military and economic power, but also a
contest of human power and morale. . . . Military and
economic power is necessarily wielded by people. **
The resistance to Maoist theories which emerged in the
late 1950s was met by a strong offensive on the part of Mao and
Defense Minister Lin Piao to purge the PLA of its professional
"elitist" attitude and to re-establish the primacy of politics.
A famous Maoist theme, "democracy," was used in this drive to
defeat elitism. "Democracy," Mao said, should be promoted both
within the military and in the military's relations with the
Mao Tse-tung, "On Coalition Government," Selected Works,
III (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1965), pp. 264-267.
1 2
Mao Tse-tung, "On Protracted War," Selected Works, II
(Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1965), p~ 143.
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masses. Mao's theory is explained in part in his 1928 essay
The Struggle in the Chingkang Mountains ;
. . . the reason why the Red Army has been able to carry
on in spite of poor material conditions and frequent
engagements is its practice of democracy. The officers
do not beat the men; officers and men receive equal
treatment; soldiers are free to hold meetings and to
speak out; trivial formalities have been done away with;
and the accounts are open for all to inspect. In China
the army needs democracy as much as the people do.
Democracy in our army is an important weapon for under-
mining the feudal mercenary army. 13
The primacy of politics was re-established in the early
1960s by the emphasis given to studying the "thought of
Mao Tse-tung" and to participation in the Party. The partic-
ipation of the army in the Party also had its roots in Maoist
theories developed during the early days of the revolutionary
movement. In November 1928, Mao had written, "The Party branch
is organized on a company basis, this is an important reason
why the Red Army has been able to carry on such arduous fighting
without falling apart." And later in 1938 in On Protracted
War
,
Mao again emphasized the importance of political work in
the army
.
Soldiers are the foundation of an army and unless they
are imbued with a progressive political spirit, and
unless such spirit is fostered through progressive
political work, it will be impossible to achieve
genuine unity between officers and men, impossible to
arouse enthusiasm for the War of Resistance to the
full, and impossible to provide an excellent basis for
13Mao Tse-tung, "The Struggle in the Chingkang Mountains,"





the most effective use of all our technical equipment
and tactics. 15
These same arguments were heard afresh in the 1960s.
While Maoist theory emphasizes the subordinate role that
the army must play in relation to the Party, Mao has never lost
sight of the tremendous power that his philosophy allows the
military to wield. "The army is the chief component of state
power. Whoever wants to seize and retain state power must have
a strong army. . . " Mao wrote in 1938. During the Cultural
Revolution, Mao found it expedient to attempt to use the power
of the army to try to purge the opponents of his policies and
to protect himself and his ideological allies.
But with the conclusion of the Cultural Revolution, the
power of the army had increased to the point that concern was
expressed about the dominating role of the military in its
relations with the Party and state. Officials began emphasizing
that the army must remember its place. Mao's quotation, "the
army must cherish the people" suddenly came into widespread use
again in 1971. No earnest student of Chairman Mao's thought
would fail to recognize that this theme was taken from Mao's
1943 work Get Organized! which includes this warning:
Our troops must observe the correct principles that
govern relations between the army and the people,
between the army and the government, between the army
and the Party and must never commit the errors of war-
Mao Tse-tung, "On Protracted War," pp. 152-155,
1 fci





lordism . . . the army must cherish the people and never
encroach upon their interests; the army must respect the
government and the Party and never assert independence.-'-'
Perhaps Mao's preoccupation with the military and with
military doctrine as reflected in the amount of his writing
devoted to the subject and in his attention to the application
of his doctrine in the new People's Liberation Army can best be
understood in the light of another of his famous sayings.
"Everything in Yenan," Mao concluded in his revolutionary days
and has reminded his countrymen ever since, "has been created
18by having guns .
"
Mao Tse-tung, "Get Organized!," Selected Works, III
(Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1965), pp. 158-159.
1 Mao Tse-tung, "On Protracted War," pp. 152-155.

THE PROFESSIONALS IN COMMAND: 1949-1959
From the conception of the People's Republic in 1949,
the role of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has gone
through several stages of change, some coming about slowly,
subtly, others featuring abrupt and dramatic turn abouts in
policy.
During its first ten years, 1949-1959, the PLA was
subject to both subtle and dramatic changes. This first decade
saw the PLA slowly evolve from a guerrilla army into a
professionally oriented force heavily influenced by foreign
military values; then abruptly saw its role in society become
part of the political disputes of the Great Leap Forward and
its leading soldier, Defense Minister Peng Te-huai, drawn into
and his career destroyed by involvement in problems of the Party
and state. This first decade, then, saw Mao Tse-tung's
theories on the role of the army as the revolutionary vanguard
of Chinese society severely tested and saw military men exposed
to influences and experiences which would have profound effects
on the PLA - its loyalties and priorities - in the decade of
the 1960s and perhaps far into the future.
While the political-military philosophy of Mao Tse-tung
had shaped the guerrilla style organization and tactics of the
Red Army, the new PLA was strongly influenced in its early
years by foreign military values. Specifically, those values
were implementation of conventional military organization and
reliance upon modern weaponry. Priority was placed upon
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discipline, technical expertise and efficiency. The impetus for
adoption of these new values was to be the Korean War. Some
difference of opinion exists concerning whether such changes
would have occurred anyway. Those who believe that the Chinese
would have turned to a conventional style military force without
the foreign influences point to plans the Chinese were making
even before establishment of the Republic which indicate
recognition of the need for a modern army. The program adopted
by the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference held
by the Communists in September 1949 had called for the building
of a "unified army" with a "unified system, unified organ-
ization and unified discipline." Others, however, point to the
same document to support the thesis that the Chinese intended
instead to maintain and use their army much as in the past.
The army, the Common Program said, was to "systematically take
part in agricultural and industrial production to assist in the
19
work of national construction."
whatever the Communists' initial intentions for their
army, the Korean War forced or hastened a re-evaluation. The
Chinese found that they were unprepared to fight a conventional
war against an enemy highly organized and armed with the most
sophisticated weapons then available. Chinese generals sent to
Korea to lead their troops into action were soon well aware of
their army's inadequacies. The very qualities which had




ization, its huge size and its emphasis upon self-reliance
rather than specialization - appeared now to be liabilities to
the PLA. Estimates of the battle casualties suffered by the
?0
PLA range from 600,000 to 900,000 men. Whatever the exact
figure, the losses were high enough to impress commanders with
the need to modernize their forces to cope with conventional
enemy armies. During this period little is known of Mao's
attitude; however, the loss of one of his sons in the fighting
may have persuaded Mao, also, of the need for the PLA's
modernization.
When it became apparent the army must immediately tackle
the task of modernization, specifically the development of a
modern organizational structure and the procurement of modern
weaponry, there was only one direction in which the Chinese
could turn for help - north to their Communist neighbor, the
Soviet Union. Though the Soviets proved less than generous
with arms and financial assistance, they were more than willing
to give the Chinese technical advice on the re-organization of
21the armed forces
.
While the changes in organization and weaponry which
took place in the PLA during this period prepared the Chinese
to fight a conventional war, they also caused a profound change
in the character of the military forces themselves. The
20John Gittings, The Role of the Chinese Army (London:




theories of Mao Tse-tung on the role of the military as the
revolutionary vanguard of Chinese society were challenged. New
attitudes and loyalties were developed within the officer corps.
Professionalism - a concern for the strictly technical aspects
of one's work - took precedence over political-ideological
considerations
.
One of the early casualties of this emphasis upon
22professional military work was the People's Militia. Time
and precious equipment could no longer be spared for the task
of equipping what most officers considered an unwieldy,
inefficient and extraneous force. In line with this movement
away from a large volunteer militia force was the institution of
23
a Soviet- style conscription system. During the Korean War the
Chinese had made much of the volunteer nature of their fighting
force. Now it, too, fell victim to the priority given to a
more efficient system of procuring the higher quality personnel
needed to man the new professional army.
Another victim was the Maoist theory on "democracy" in
the armed forces. Mao's incantation of "democracy" was replaced
by Stalin's emphasis upon the need for discipline. Army
publications quoted Stalin on the need for discipline as the
key to modernization and hence to the creation of an army






was to be the first step to education which was in turn
necessary to master modern weapon systems and organizational
techniques. To meet these needs new regulations on discipline
were promulgated in July 1953 and a massive training program
was begun throughout the PLA. The program covered the fields
of weapon training and manuevers, organization and planning.
The Liberation Army Newspaper demanded improvements in
artillery training, anti-aircraft defense, mechanization,
scientific research and logistics. Even the People's Daily
,
the Party newspaper, editorialized on the need for technical
training and discipline. "Military training should be
intensified and the PLA should redouble its efforts to
strengthen its highly centralized and united organization's
0/
disciplinary qualities" the paper demanded.
Specialization within the officer corps was another
major change with ideological overtones accomplished in this
period. The new regulations on officers service published in
1955 prescribed in detail the designations of officers in 16
different arms or branches of the PLA from cavalry corps to
medical branch. Awards and medals were provided for as was the
institution of a rank structure. Entry into the officer corps
was, according to the new regulation, to be confined, in the
main, to graduates of military schools and academies.
Selection was to be based upon an individual's scholastic





one grade to the next according to a fixed schedule. Maoist
theories on the need for a "single class" army were clearly not
of a high priority.
This emphasis upon professional priorities at the
expense of ideological/political considerations is probably
best illustrated by the new role of the political commissar.
Where once he had been the powerful equal (and sometimes
superior) of the combat commander he was now at every level of
command clearly the subordinate. And subject to criticism. By
1956, political officers were directed to become familiar with
the technical training requirements of their units - qualify on
proficiency tests - or face removal from their posts.
Thus, with the inception of modernization, a professional
vision had begun to emerge in the PLA which was essentially in
opposition to the principles of Mao Tse-tung on the correct
role of the military in Chinese society. Officers became
opposed to any diversion of military resources and time to
political tasks which might adversely affect the efficiency of
the modern military establishment they were building. The
period of the Great Leap Forward, in the latter half of the
1950s, saw an effort by Mao and his supporters to re-affirm the










Before preceding to a discussion of the period of the
Great Leap Forward, the question of the army's role in society
which was debated during this time must be placed in
perspective. It was not the character and future role of the
PLA alone which was the subject of debate in the late 1950s
between those favoring emphasis upon ideological considerations
and those who gave priority to modernization. The question of
the army's future was part of the broader question of the
future goals and character of all of Chinese society. In
addition, those participating in the debates did not consider
the degree of cleavage between them so wide as the rather stark
terms used to describe the two camps -"red" and "expert"- might
imply. The Maoists did not oppose all modernization. And
their opponents would have been appalled at any suggestion that
they were opposed to the study and application of ideology. Yet
the issues first raised during the Great Leap Forward do seem to
have become part of a larger question, one that has continued
to be debated through the 1960s and 1970s. Can a society retain
its revolutionary character and at the same time maintain the
stability necessary for progress in building a modern state?
And specifically in the case of the PLA, can it retain its
revolutionary character and maintain the security of China in
an age of nuclear forces? Are the two requirements mutually
incompatible or is it possible that acceptable and workable
priorities can be established?
The two sides of the debate over the future character of
the PLA are represented in statements made by two of the major
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adversaries, Marshals Peng Te-huai and Chu Teh. Marshal Peng,
leader of the Chinese forces in the Korean War and Minister of
Defense since 1954, stated the case of the professional
military. He questioned the relevance of theories rooted in a
revolutionary period to the responsibilities of a modern army.
"Past revolutionary experience has definitely limited value,"
Peng insisted. And he criticized those who were "satisfied
only with past battle experience and are not sufficiently
enthusiastic about the study of modernized military knowl-
edge.
Marshal Chu Teh was equally blunt in stating the position
of the Maoists. Marshal Chu, the Red Army hero who had chosen
to retire from active service after liberation, spoke as a
member of the Politburo. In a 1958 speech Chu said:
There are people who advocate an exclusively military
viewpoint, who have a one-sided regard for military
affairs and look down upon politics, have a one-sided
high regard for vocation and technique and look down
upon ideology. They only deal with tactics and tech-
niques but not strategy; they only want the army but
neglect the function of the masses of the people; they
only pay attention to national defense, but not to the
significance of economic construction to national
defense. In essence this is kind of a manifestation of
bourgeois military ideas. This is contrary to Marxism-
Leninism. 28
The period of the Great Leap, then, saw a confrontation











tionary qualities and priorities within the PLA. Specifically,
the Maoists hoped to accomplish this by reviving the old revo-
lutionary models of the "mass line," and "democracy" and by
re-establishing the army as an "army of labor."
The PLA's failure to apply the "mass line" in military
policies was one of the first and from an ideological stand-
point one of the most serious accusations made against the
professional military leadership. This failure to apply the
mass line, the Maoists said, was manifested in two erroneous
policies: overdependence upon weapons and, correspondingly,
failure to utilize people as a part of the military arsenal.
The PLA should utilize more effectively China's most abundant
resource, people. One way to do this, the Maoists contended,
was through the revival of the People's Militia.
In August 1958, the PLA was placed in charge of the
'Everyone a Soldier' movement in which everyone eligible for
conscription who was not chosen was sent to join the militia.
In turn this militia force was directed to spearhead the
commune movement which was instituted at the same time. PLA
officers were expected to train this force - said to number 220
million by the end of 1959 - in military arts and direct its
29
work in the communes.
Another campaign, this one titled the "Officers to the
Ranks" movement, was commenced to combat the lack of "democracy"





revolutionary fervor. The army, they said, had taken on the
trappings of an elitist organization. Officers had alienated
themselves from the rank and file. "Big Bossism" in the form
of an overbearing attitude toward subordinates, excessively
harsh discipline methods and the taking of special privileges
by virtue of position were some of the accusations made against
30
the new professional officers.
To combat these tendencies and to instill appreciation
for the "democratic" values of the old Red Army, the "Officers
to the Ranks" movement required every officer to spend thirty
days each year performing the duties of an ordinary soldier
including cleaning latrines and serving in the mess halls.
Over 150,000 officers including 160 generals were said to have
31participated in this movement by 1959.
Finally, the PLA was directed to participate in the
economic effort of the Great Leap as part of the labor force.
It was to participate in both agricultural and industrial
projects. In response, the PLA's Political Department drew up
a "Program for Participation and Support by Army Units in the
Agricultural Co-operative Movement and Agricultural Production"















purpose of this participation was not only to boost production
but also to reduce what the Maoists considered the army's
deliberate isolation from society. Arrogance and high-
handedness, they felt, had characterized the army's dealings
with civilians too often in the past. Now the soldiers must
labor side by side with the workers and peasants.
The results of this Great Leap Forward were a
disappointment to Mao and his followers.
The militia movement fell far short of expectations. Of
the 220 million militiamen officially enrolled only about
fifteen percent ever received any training to qualify them in
firearm use. A major reason was undoubtedly apathy on the part
of PLA officers responsible for the training. But a root
problem was the paradox of a militia in a commune environment
in which either the militia was efficiently organized to the
detriment of production or it existed on paper only. The
"Officers to the Ranks" movement, meanwhile, created more
»
confusion than goodwill and understanding. Time spent in
training was said to have been shortened by two months in 1959
as the PLA struggled to cope with administrative problems
created by the shuffling of personnel and absense of responsible
and trained officers from their regular duties. Finally, the
"army of labor" was unable to give enough assistance in agri-
cultural and industrial projects to effect production. Addition
of inexperienced soldiers to agricultural teams often caused
disruption of otherwise orderly work routines within the
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communes and cooperatives. In industry the same problem was
33
evident.
If the results of the Great Leap Forward were disap-
pointing to the Maoists, their consequences were alarming to
the army leadership. By the summer of 1959, the PLA high
command was deeply concerned about the nation's military
readiness as training, discipline, and morale dipped lower and
lower. Party and state officials were equally concerned about
the nation's general morale and economic well-being. Dissat-
isfaction and concern were in the air as the Party Central
Committee convened a plenum session at Lushan in July.
Spokesman at Lushan for these dissatisfied and concerned
officials was, surprisingly, Minister of Defense, Marshal Peng
Te-huai. Peng was a military officer unfamiliar with the
subtleties of politics when he became Defense Minister in 1954.
And during his years at the post, Peng had developed no
reputation for involving himself in nonmilitary affairs. His
ideological knowledge was limited, as was his formal education.
Instead, Peng was known as a soldier's soldier - stubborn,
courageous in battle and immensely popular with his troops. He
was of peasant origins and owed his present prominent position
as a member of the highest ranks of the People's Republic
entirely to his association with the army.
33
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While most of Peng's old comrades in the Red Army had
taken positions in the Party or state apparatus after liber-
ation, Peng had remained with the army. He had, more than his
old comrades, an appreciation and understanding of the
requirements of conventional warfare and of the military-
strategic significance of nuclear weapons. It was Peng who,
in 1957, had led the Chinese delegation to Moscow to negotiate
an agreement with the Soviets giving China some initial aid in
developing a nuclear capacity. Like the army as a whole, Peng
had come to place priority on organization, planning and
modernization. Ideology was important to Peng - he had after
all been a member of the Party since 1927 - but clearly his
responsibility for the nation's security was his first priority.
Peng's disagreement with Maoist programs imposed upon
the PLA during the Great Leap Forward was well known. Peng had
openly criticized the employment of troops in farm and
industrial projects. In January 1959, the PLA's General
Political Department had issued a statement warning:
There is a definite conflict between participation in
national construction and training in their respective
demands for time.
. . . Needless to say, as the army is
an armed combat organization, it must carry out its
task as a work force in such a way that its task as a
combat force is not affected. . . .35
As quoted earlier, Peng had come to believe that "past revolu-
tionary experience has a clearly limited value." In taking this
position Peng was taking issue with what he considered the





related also was the issue of the worsening relations with the
Soviet Union. Having perhaps a better appreciation for the
military might which the modern, nuclear armed Soviet military-
represented, Peng was apparently deeply concerned by the rami-
fications on Chinese security that a split with the Soviet
Union would cause. Less than a month before Lushan, Peng had
traveled to Moscow and Eastern Europe where he had spoken with
Soviet military and government officials including Premier
Nikita Khrushchev. While Peng is not known to have ever
addressed himself publicly on the issue of Sino-Soviet
relations, it is believed he was opposed to any break in ties
with the Soviets.
Thus it was that Marshal Peng attacked Mao and his
policies of the Great Leap Forward at the Lushan meeting. He
is alleged to have questioned the validity of Mao's theories on
partisan warfare, opposed the training of a militia and
expressed approval of a professionally oriented army.
The immediate result of this attack upon Mao and his
policies was the dismissal of Peng from his defense ministry
post. Yet the case of Marshal Peng must have appeared as an
ominous symbolic portent of the future, both to the PLA and to
the Party. To the PLA, the fate of Peng must represent an
example of the pitfalls laying before an officer who must some-
how meet increasingly contradictory demands upon the army. To
David A. Charles, "The Dismissal of Marshal Peng
Te-huai," China Quarterly, No. 8, 1961, p. 63.
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the Party, Peng must surely have appeared as only the most
prominent and only the first in the ranks of those officers in
the PLA who had developed new priorities not consonant with the
long held theories of Mao Tse-tung.
Dismissed with Peng were five officers of the General
37Headquarters Staff. All had distinguished careers with the
Red Army dating back at least to the Long March. They had,
apparently, been caught like Peng between the demands of their
professional responsibilities and the political demands of the
Party. Their dismissal, the Party hoped, would serve as a
lesson to others in the army. The Party and politics were to
take priority over the army and the gun.
Despite Marshal Peng's criticism and unhappiness in the
army with Mao's policies, there seems little question of the
PLA's basic loyalty to the Party and government in 1959. The
debate following Marshal Peng's speech at Lushan had been
climaxed by an emotional scene in which Mao, in reply to a
suggestion that the removal of Peng might cause a revolt in the
armed forces declared with tears in his eyes that, if this
happened, he (Mao) would go back to the villages and recruit
another army. Appalled, the generals present rose and pledged
38their loyalty to Mao. Yet the question of the army's loyalty
had been raised. In the years to come it's loyalties and
37John Gittings, "Military Control and Leadership,
1949-1964," China Quarterly





priorities were to be tested again. Would the same scenario
result?
For the moment the scene at Lushan signalled a victory
for the Maoist philosophy of a revolutionary army. And it
signalled the entry to center stage of Lin Piao and politics to
command in the PLA.

LIN PIAO AND POLITICS TAKE COMMAND: 1959-1965
Lin Piao inherited a demoralized military concerned for
its own future as the Great Leap Forward ended. He had, by the
opening of the Cultural Revolution some six years later,
repoliticized the PLA in accordance with Mao Tse-tung's wishes
and earned for himself a position as Mao's first and most
valued lieutenant. During this critical period, between the
upheavals of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution,
Lin had, it seemed, once again turned the PLA into the vanguard
of revolution as Mao had always envisioned it.
How had Mao made such a fortuitous selection as Lin Piao
in 1959 and how had Lin managed to gain acceptance within the
ranks of both the Party leadership and the army? The answer
would seem to lie in the shadowy personality and background of
Lin Piao. Perhaps no more enigmatic figure existed in the ranks
of the Chinese Communist leadership than Lin. This, indeed, may
have been a major reason for his acceptability to the Party and
army in 1959 and a key to his ability to retain his position
through twelve tumultuous years wedged between the demands of
the revolutionary bent Mao and the conservative officers of his
command
.
Lin was one of the legendary heroes of the Red Army
having led the central column of Communist survivors during the
Long March. After liberation he was believed to have been the
most effective of the army's commanders in Korea. At the same
time, Lin had no history of political activity and hence few, if
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any, enemies in the Party or army. Indeed, Lin's career prior
to 1959 had been marked by long absences from public activity.
It was said that he suffered from a serious, recurrent illness,
possibly tuberculosis. In any case, Lin had been absent from
Party and army circles during long periods in the 1930s, 1940s
and again from 1953 until his sudden reappearance in the fall
39
of 1959 as the new defense minister. Significantly, then,
Lin had been absent from army and Party councils during that
period when debate was most intense concerning the future
character and role of the army in post-revolutionary China.
Thus, Lin's assets appear to have been his reputation as a
brilliant military strategist in both the Red Army and the
early days of the PLA, no known significant opponents in the
Party or army, and no known position on the issues which had
split the professionals and ideologues.
Lin needed all of the good will which he could muster
during his first two years in office. The period 1959-1961 was
one of the most difficult the People's Republic had yet faced.
All of the mistakes of the Great Leap Forward seemed to bear
down upon China at one time exacerbated by droughts in the north
and floods along China's great Yangtze River basin. The
inflated production figures of the late 1950s were revealed for
what they truly were - shams created to cover up massive short
comings. Shortages were so severe that famine was not uncommon
39
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in many areas of China. Discontent and even unrest grew in many
areas of China.
The PLA was not unaffected. The soldiers of the PLA
represented a cross section of all of China. The economic
hardships and social discontent in the countryside was soon
reflected in the army as well. Copies of a secret Chinese
military paper entitled Bulletin of Activities
,
intended to
keep high ranking officers informed of conditions in the PLA,
were smuggled to Taiwan in 1964. They reveal that in 1960 and
1961, Chinese military authorities were deeply concerned about
the morale and even the reliability of troops in some units.
The number of soldiers with families in disaster areas was
considerable; resultant concern on the part of these men
reached levels where dissertion and even mutiny were considered
possibilities.
Thus the disaffection with Maoist policies of the Great
Leap Forward was not exclusive to officers dissatisfied over
neglect of professional concerns but extended to enlisted
personnel resentful of economic and social hardships. In this
serious situation, Lin acted purposefully. He took steps
which alleviated the alarm of the professional officers
concerning the readiness and capability of the PLA to fight a
40
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conventional war. Emphasis was once again placed upon
proficiency in use of arms, combat training and development of
a modern weapon system including nuclear arms. To reduce hard-
ships among the rank and file, Lin announced an increase in
42
pay. whether problems were eliminated seemed less important
than the fact that attention had been given, acknowledgement
made, of the concerns of the officers and men whose good will
and cooperation Lin Piao would need to reach his long-term
goals.
The goals Lin had in mind were - in retrospect - clear
enough. "Unconditional loyalty of the People's Liberation Army
to the Party and to Comrade Mao," Lin had pledged in his
initial policy speech as defense minister. He had called for
stricter Party control, more contact with the masses and inten-
sified political education. Lin had, after all, utilized in
all of his campaigns as an army commander the theories of
Mao Tse-tung. He had left active command before the PLA had
begun to adopt the values of more conventional warfare. Lin's
pledge had seemed at the time more a ritual homage to Mao than
an assertion of policy and his call for greater emphasis on
ideology had been couched in conciliatory phrases.
Robinson, p. 80.
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Thus it was in an atmosphere of delicate cooperation and
good will that Lin set out to repoliticize the PLA. This he
did not alone but with the authority of a powerful new
political-military organization to legitimize his actions. The
new organization, formed at the same time as Lin's appointment
in 1959, was the Military Affairs Committee (MAC). The mission
of MAC was to act as the Politburo's agent in directing and
coordinating the plans of the Ministry of Defense, the General
Staff, the General Political Department and other general
departments of the PLA.
Like Lin Piao, the MAC was rather mysterious. It did
not appear in any organization charts of either the PLA or the
Party. Its membership was not announced. As of mid 1961,
however, the influential MAC was known to consist of at least
eight officials, six of them active or retired marshals and two
of them generals of the PLA.
The policy orientation of the committee was predictable.
Its members constituted the majority of the almost legendary
leaders of the Red Army. They had long been indoctrinated in
Mao's military doctrine. Their experience in military affairs
had been gained in years of guerrilla or semi-conventional
warfare. Masters of revolutionary warfare, as a group they
were far less qualified by experience to supervise a vast,
modernized military establishment. Above all, the committee
was united by a common bond of experience as loyal, senior
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44lieutenants of Mao Tse-tung.
Lin and the MAC, then, were predisposed to, in Chinese
terminology, "lean to one side." They reflected as a group
Mao's dissatisfaction with the political consciousness and
reliability of the armed forces. The MAC is believed to have
begun as early as 1960 to map plans to re-politicize the PLA;
by the close of 1961 as morale was once again restored and Lin
gained the confidence and good will of key elements of the
army, Lin and the MAC made their move.
The reassertion of the Party control apparatus within
the army was the first task of Lin and the MAC. The political
commissar had been a tradition in the army from the earliest
days of the Red Army. He had symbolized at every level of
command the importance of ideology in the army. His demise
from co-equal of the combat commander during the 1950s had
signaled the greater emphasis placed upon professional concerns
at the expense of ideology. Consequently, the return to
prominence of the political officer in the 1960s was an
important symbolic gesture as well as a practical means of
reasserting Party control in the army. Emphasis was placed
upon restoring political leadership at the company level and
below where it was believed to be most critically needed.
Officers and enlisted men at this level of command were consid-
ered to be least imbued with ideological awareness since most
44Ralph L. Powell, "The Military Affairs Committee and
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had entered the PLA during the period when technical training,
not political education, was stressed. All companies that had
lacked Party committees now established them. Some eighty-
percent of the platoons organized Party cells and fifty percent
of the squads were assigned at least one Party member.
Recruiting for membership in the Party resulted in 229,000 new
members in one year alone.
Hand in hand with the restoration of political leader-
ship was the reinstitution of political education. Some 78,000
cadres were transferred from other duties to act as instructors
of political thought among the rank and file. Time for this
study was made possible by a reduction in time spent on
technical training. "Mao Tse-tung thought" formed the basis of
this political education. The study of Mao's theories, it was
emphasized, was to be given priority over "foreign experi-
ences," even those of Marx, Engels and Lenin. The curriculum
of the Political Academy of the PLA was changed from the study
of philosophy, history, economics and political science
utilizing foreign texts to the study of socialism and communism
46based upon Chinese Communist textbooks.
Next came a campaign to "re-democratize" the PLA. "Our
army had no system of military rank during the protracted






This system came into effect in 1955 after victory
throughout the country. Ten years of practice has
proved that it is not in conformity with our army's
glorious tradition with the close relation between
officers and men, between the higher and lower
levels. . . .
In response, the rank system was officially abolished in 1965.
An order directed that the cap insignia, epaulettes and collar
insignia and the insignia denoting various services, arms and
branches be removed. The Liberation Army Daily , overjoyed,
responded with yet another editorial explaining to any dubious
professionals that, "The abolition of ranks will help us remold
ourselves ideologically ..." and would "promote the revolu-
tionization of the army. . . ."
Having set out to reinstitute internal democracy, Lin
also ordered steps to bring about "democracy" in the army's
relations with the people. This was to be accomplished through
a form of dual leadership of the military at the regional
forces level and below. Cooperation with officials of the
Party and state at regional, provincial and primary (city and
county) levels was directed. By the end of 1965, army
commanders throughout China were working in close tandem with
their civilian counterparts. Utilization of the militia was
one area of common interest. Organization and training of the
militia had become the most important mission of the regional
commanders under Lin and these militia were placed at the




in production projects. In conscription and public security
projects the military officers and civil officials also worked
closely to assist each other. The commanders supplied troops
to act as "policemen" in the garrison towns and the officials
provided statistical and administrative help in organizing the
conscription drive. Thus, on a day to day basis, the
commanders from the regional headquarters on down to the
garrison commands established close working relationships and
often personal friendships with their counterparts in the Party
and government. Lin Piao had clearly accomplished his goal of
establishing close relations between the army and the Party and
state. But the results, revealed in the crises of the Cultural
Revolution, Lin neither desired nor expected.
For the time being, however, Lin and the Maoists were
pleased with the results of their efforts to re-politicize the
PLA. And no one was more pleased than Mao Tse-tung. Mao had,
after the debacle of the Great Leap Forward, been forced to
relinquish part of his authority, resigning as Chairman of the
Republic. Since that time he had been forced more and more to
a role as senior statesman called upon to legitimize state
decisions but given limited power to control the decision
making process. Mao felt constrained in this role and
displeased with what he saw occurring within the Party and
government. Both, he feared, were turning into over- sized,
48Harvey Nelson, "Military Forces in the Cultural
Revolution," China Quarterly . No. 51, 1972, p. 488.
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rigid bureaucracies staffed by an increasingly elitest corps of
cadres. The revolutionaries and revolutionary spirit had
disappeared. Mao, who had railed against the revisionism of
the Soviet Union, became convinced that the Chinese revolution
must be a continuous process or meet the same fate. New revolu-
tionaries and a new revolutionary spirit must be molded and
instilled in Chinese society.
As Mao cast about for support he turned naturally to
Lin Piao and the army. Had not the weak and demoralized
Chinese Communists of the 1920s gained the power to legitimize
their goals when they formed the Red Army? Had not Mao himself
long proclaimed that political power grows out of the barrel of
a gun? Was not the PLA the one structure in China in the 1960s
which had set about to re-invigorate itself with political
consciousness? Would it not be prepared once again to serve as
the vanguard of a revolutionary society? At the least, would
the army not provide an excellent example to the Party, the
government, the intellectuals and to all of the masses?
It would indeed. A "learn from the PLA" campaign was
begun at Mao's behest in 1964. All political, economic and
social organizations were directed to study and emulate the
army's methods of organization, operation and ideological
training. Steps were taken to establish a network of political
work departments modeled after the PLA's political commissar
system in Party and government organs. These departments were
staffed primarily by political commissars transferred from the
PLA. Approval of these emulations of the PLA came from a
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number of influential sources. "All our Party and government
organs and the broad mass of our cadres should learn from the
thoroughly revolutionary spirit and style of work of the
Liberation Army," Chou En-lai suggested in a speech. And an
editorial in the People's Daily enthused, "In learning from the
PLA, comrades on each front shall raise even higher the Red
Banner of Mao Tse-tung's thinking."
Bathing in the spotlight of Mao's approval of the PLA
was, quite naturally, its leader, Lin Piao. It was Lin to whom
Mao gave credit for the re-politicization of the PLA. And it was
during this period, in 1964 and 1965, that Lin Piao began,
contrary to his custom, to speak out as Mao's champion. Lin
took up the Maoist cudgels in a long article entitled "Long Live
the Victory of People's War!" Together with his address to the
Ninth Party Congress in 1969, this article is the sum of Lin's
major theoretical pronouncements. Appropriately, it consisted
of a high quotient of quotations from Mao interspersed by a few
of Lin's own interpretations of Mao's theories. One new
element, however, did appear. For the first time, Lin advanced
Mao as an original ideological theorist equal to Marx and Lenin.
"Mao Tse-tung's thought," Lin said, "has integrated the
universal truth of Marxism-Leninism, thus adding new weapons to
the arsenal of Marxism-Leninism." This elevation of Mao's
49Jordan, p. 35.
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views into the realm of sacrosanct ideology naturally was
intended to remove Mao's pronouncements from the realm of
debate or opposition.
This article, published in September 1965, is now
considered to have been one in the volley of opening shots of
the Cultural Revolution. The PLA originated many of these first
rhetorical shots. Specifically, it did this by the publication
of two other political tracts which were to be among the first
portents of the new cult of Mao and revolution. The first of
these was the publication of Quotations from Chairman Mao by
the General Political Department of the army in 1964. This
celebrated "little red book" was to become the bible of the
equally celebrated Red Guards, providing them with guidance in
adopting the proper revolutionary political attitudes. The
second publication was an article printed in the Liberation
Army Daily of 29 November 1965. It contained an attack on a
play written by the vice-mayor of Peking, Wu Han. The hero of
Wu's play had, in good revolutionary fashion, attacked the
exulted position of an emperor. -The "hero," however, bore a
striking resemblance to the dismissed Marshal Peng and the
"emperor" was unmistakably Mao. The criticism of Wu set off a
chain of attacks on other intellectuals as well as Party and
government officials who took issue with Mao.
As 1966 began it appeared that Lin Piao had achieved his




however, without encountering opposition. There is evidence
that a major "house cleaning" had taken place within the
higher echelons of the PLA as Lin moved to consolidate his
position. Changes were made in the central headquarters and at
the regional and provincial levels. Key officers who might
oppose Lin's policies were replaced with trusted supporters.
The first major shake-up had occurred in 1963 when Lin
replaced the commander and vice minister of the Public
Security Troops, the commander of the Peking garrison and the
Hopei and Shansi military district commanders. In 1964 and
1965, new PLA commanders were assigned to strategic posts in
52Nanking, Canton, Honan and Kunming. The change with most
apparent political connotations, however, was the removal of
Chief of Staff Lo Jui-chin in 1965. Lo was criticized for
advocating a "bougeoisie military line" which placed more
importance in warfare upon the effects of weapons and less upon
human factors. Lo was also said to have opposed the PLA's use
53in large scale agricultural projects. Lo's dismissal, in
retrospect, seems less surprising and perhaps less significant
than his longevity in his post. He had assumed his position in
1959 and had maintained his influential post throughout the
period when Lin was attempting to redirect the PLA away from
52Derek J. Waller, The Government and Po_litics_pf
Communist China (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company,





the views Lo was said to have represented. Lo must have
enjoyed some important support during all of those years.
The reforms and personnel purges of this period appeared
to have successfully turned the PLA into a revolutionary army
which might be used by Lin and Mao for their political
purposes. The use of PLA organs to verbally attack Mao's
opponents and spread Mao Tse-tung thought seemed portents for
the future. Yet only a small cabal of senior officers,
trusted lieutenants surrounding Lin Piao, had committed
themselves to the coming political struggle; had participated
in its preparation; or, for that matter, apparently perceived
the significance of the initial rhetorical debates. The
remainder of the army apparently neither fully understood nor
was responsible for the machinations taking place in Peking.
It remained yet to be heard from.

THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION: 1966-1969
The years of the Cultural Revolution were for the PLA, as
for the other elements of society, the most chaotic and most
challenging since 1949. The Cultural Revolution was a test of
the character of the army. And it was the most severe test to
date of the Maoist theories on the role of the army in society.
Could the PLA function in a post revolutionary society as the
vanguard of a new revolution? What were the priorities and
loyalties of its officers? The Cultural Revolution went a long
way toward answering these questions.
The PLA's participation in the Cultural Revolution can be
broken down into four periods representing various stages of
activity. These periods (1) the year 1966, (2) winter and
spring 1967, (3) summer 1967 and (4) fall 1967 through April
1969, will be discussed in detail to indicate the development of
the role of the PLA to its - in retrospect, not so surprising -
conclusion.
1966
In February 1966, Madame Mao - Chiang Ching - convened in
Shanghai a "Forum on the Literary and Art Work in the Armed
Forces." The report issued at the end of this eighteen day
forum hardly concerned itself with the state of the arts in the
54
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army. Instead the report, personally revised by Mao, spelled
out Mao's intention to launch the Great Proletarian Cultural
Revolution as a campaign against the "revisionist" Party and
state apparatus. China was to begin, the document said, an
arduous, long-term campaign designed to eliminate those who
opposed Mao. More ominously, the communique asserted that the
drive would be carried out by the army - "The chief instrument
of the dictatorship of the proletariat in China." This
document was to be the blueprint of the Cultural Revolution.
At this time in 1966, Mao Tse-tung had found himself
opposed in the top leadership of the Politburo by a majority of
its members led by the chief of state, Liu Shao-chi. Mao saw
his radical policies opposed at almost every turn and his
influence carefully reined. Only Lin Piao and the army
appeared to espouse and apply Maoist principles and policies.
Consequently, with Madame Mao as his agent, Mao had used the
army as his forum, his vehicle in officially opening a campaign
against what he considered revisionist elements in all of
Chinese society.
After the Shanghai Communique was issued, through the
auspices of the PLA, Lin Piao and his closest associates in the
army central leadership began actively to promote the Cultural
Revolution. The Liberation Army Daily was used to attack Mao's
critics in the intellectual community. It served as a counter-
point to the Party organ, the People's Daily
,
in the propa-
ganda battle between Mao and his critics. By June 1966, Lin
and other Maoists succeeded in seizing the People's Daily
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editorial board and placing it under the control of the PLA's
newly formed PLA Cultural Revolution Group. (This group had
been formed by the General Political Department of the PLA at
the instructions of the MAC to direct Cultural Revolution
activities in the army. It was under almost continual attack
and purge until its disestablishment; membership became a
dubious distinction.)
The culmination of this support by Lin and the central
PLA leadership for the instigation of the Cultural Revolution
came on 19 August in Peking's Tienanmen Square when a million
Maoist supporters - most of them teen-age Red Guards - met to
rally support. Lin Piao was the main speaker. Mao, symbol-
ically, wore a military uniform for the first time in anyone's
56
memory.
While the central leadership was busy promoting the
Cultural Revolution from Peking, it was business more or less
as usual for the PLA in the provinces. The thrust of the
revolution had thus far been directed at the youth of China and
at the educational system. For its part, the PLA was to
participate in its now customary role as teacher and helper.
Military districts and garrisons were called upon to send out
cadres from their political departments to act as teachers in





traveling to and from Peking and about the country on their
crusades, the PLA arranged their transportation and acted as
chaperones.
By late summer, however, the crusades of the Red Guards
began to take a new turn. No longer were the objects of their
reforming rage restricted to China's education system and
intellectual community. Now the Red Guards and other Maoists
turned on the Party and state. Strikes closed factories,
judicial and police organs were attacked and discredited, work
at Party headquarters and state offices was disrupted, and
"bad elements" with nonproletarian class backgrounds were
attacked and often robbed. Personal attacks were made upon
officials at every level and these officials were subjected to
CO
humiliating and often cruel interrogation sessions.
The assaults by the Red Guards and "revolutionary
rebels" on the provincial Party and state structure revealed
some of the loyalties and priorities of the army. The local
and regional military commanders were alarmed by the havoc, by
the disruption caused to the daily functioning of vital activ-
ities, by the lack of discipline shown by the "rebels" and by
the personal attacks made upon officials with whom they were
closely associated. Values they cherished were disregarded.
And the Cultural Revolution was coming uncomfortably close.





At this point it is necessary to pause a moment to
describe the organizational structure of the PLA as this
structure and the duties assigned within the structure appear
to have significantly effected response to the events taking
place around the PLA during the Cultural Revolution. The PLA
is divided into two major forces, each with a separate mission.
The elite of the PLA are the 36 army corps, the Navy and the
59Air Force. The units of these forces are centrally
controlled from Peking and are generally stationed in the most
strategically sensitive border areas of China - in the north
along the border with the Soviet Union, in the southeast across
from Taiwan and in the far south along the Vietnamese border.
Since these forces are designated to protect China from attack
and form the first line of defense, they are naturally accorded
highest priority. They are provided with the newest and
largest supply 'Of weapons, assigned the brightest and most
competent officers and troops and given priority in promotion
and other amenities. Significantly, given the high priority of
their military assignment, fewer non-military responsibilities
are assigned. They are allowed to concentrate for the most
part upon technical training at the expense of political
training and allowed to concentrate on their missions without
interference from local Party or state officials. They are, in
short, elite and aloof from politics.
59Harvey Nelson, "Military Forces in the Cultural
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The remainder of the PLA is assigned to the regional
forces - a vast, decentralized army spread throughout the
countryside. The regional forces are divided into eleven
regions, 23 provincial districts and numerous garrisons in
larger cities. The eleven regional commanders are responsible
for the provincial districts and the larger garrisons. The
provincial commanders control the independent units and
smaller garrisons within their provinces. This huge armed
force is the poor cousin to the more elite units. The
regional forces are assigned weapons and other equipment out-
moded or not needed by the elite corps. Their officers and
troops are those not considered good enough for the more vital
forces. Their assignment is primarily to maintain internal
security and to train the militia.
The regional forces were Lin's major target when in the
early 1960s he began to repoliticize the PLA. And one of the
most important effects on the regional forces had been the
knitting together of state, Party and military at the regional
level and below through the linking of their leadership. The
most important manifestation of this policy was the appointment
of senior provincial Party secretaries as concurrent political
commissars of the military districts. In 1966, eighteen of
23 districts had this arrangement. As described in section IV,
this cooperation between Party and state officials with their




natural outgrowth of the role assigned to the army in Maoist
theory.
It should not be surprising then that regional force
officers of the PLA were those most alarmed at the new turn
which the Cultural Revolution had taken in late 1966. The
economy had been disrupted, particularly in the cities.
Schools were closed and youths were roving in bands through
the cities uncontrolled. Professional associates in the Party
and state bureaucracy were under personal attack and the
business of the Party and state had come near to a halt. State
property was looted, violence was on the increase. After
initial confusion and inaction, Party and state officials had
begun an offensive of their own. They organized Red Guard
factions of their own to challenge the Maoists. They took
steps to safeguard their offices and property. They began
counter propaganda campaigns
.
Caught between these two factions, the PLA commanders
became increasingly uncomfortable. On the one hand they were
the teachers and chaperones of the Maoist faction; on the
other, they were the professional associates of the Party and
state officials. And above all, they were responsible for the
security of the nation. Throughout the delicate last days of
1966 the PLA walked a treacherous high wire at once arranging
transportation to Peking rallies for the Red Guards and at the
same time rescuing civilian officials from scenes of physical





It was a state of affairs which could not last.
Winter and Spring 1967
With the new year, the leadership of the Cultural
Revolution in Peking found that their revolution had turned
into a disordered stalemate throughout most of China. Action
had to be taken, Mao personally decided, to both end the
disorder and to tip the balance in the power struggle in favor
of the Maoists. With the Party and the state already caught
up in the struggle, Mao could only turn to the one structure in
society still in tact and responsive to commands, the PLA. The
PLA's response and the events of 1967 which were to follow were
hardly what Mao must have expected.
At a meeting of the Central Cultural Revolution Group in
Peking in mid January the plight of the revolution was bluntly
faced. It had become evident to the Maoists that their conser-
vative opponents were stronger and more intransigent than
expected and their supporters, the Red Guards and revolutionary
rebels, more difficult to control. A decision was made, some-
what reluctantly, to call upon the army to restore order and to
purge the conservative opponents of Mao Tse-tung. The
rationale for this decision was provided by Mao himself. "The
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The question therefore is not one of involvement or
noninvolvement . It is one of whose side we should
stand on and whether we should support the revolu-
tionaries or the conservative or even the rightists.
The PLA should actively support the revolutionary-
forces.
This was the setting on 23 January 1967 when the MAC issued
orders to the PLA to take over administrative functions in the
country and to "support the left."
The PLA began at once - and with considerable relish -
to carry out the first part of this order. The first priority
of almost all PLA commanders was to restore order in China.
This they could do by controlling administrative functions.
Military units occupied industrial plants and warehouses,
moved into communes and took control of the police and security
establishments
.
Not surprisingly, the PLA's first step was the seizure
of the police and public security organs. These institutions
constituted the major internal security mechanisms in China and
included the secret police and armed security units at
government levels from the center in Peking down to villages
and streets. The seizures usually took the form of estab-
lishing military control committees inside the bureaus at each
successive level of authority. But it also required, given
the degree of lawlessness at the time, the commitment of troops
to supplement the overtaxed and demoralized police and
security forces. The PLA thus became involved in arresting
CO
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criminals, stopping riots, controlling traffic, sponsoring
public trials and supervising prisons.
The PLA also showed no reluctance in assuming its new
expanded role in the economy. The decline in the morale and
authority of the rural and industrial cadres had broken down
the regular economic leadership. The military was directed to
move into this vacuum. Large numbers of PLA personnel were
sent into local communes and farming brigades. Emphasis was
-
placed upon improving strained working relations between
supervising cadres and workers and upon preventing sabotage and
increasing slack labor discipline among peasants caused by the
confusion of recent events. The order to support industrial
production in factories and mines received an even more
positive response than the call to enter the communes and
farms. Responsible for national defense and suffering from the
increasing obsolescence of weapons, the PLA commanders had a
specially vital interest in protecting and promoting industry.
Consequently, PLA men quickly moved into industries and worked
to end strikes and disruptions and increase production.
The regional force commanders found increasing power
placed in their hands by the control of these vital functions.
The way that they chose to use this power should not have been
surprising given their priorities and loyalties. Once in charge
of the police and security functions they increased their
6 3
Ralph L. Powell, "Soldiers in the Economy," Asian
Survey
, No.. 8, August 1971, pp. 748-753.

56
protection of Party and state officials as well as state
offices and documents. And Red Guards who got out of hand were
dealt with firmly. In industry and agriculture the PLA acted
as armed persuaders and not as armed producers. The practical
reason for this was the lack of experience and know-how of
soldiers in running industrial and agricultural projects.
Working alliances often resulted between the military and the
managerial and technical cadres at the expense of the Maoists
in mines and factories, communes and cooperatives. The PLA
was unwilling to promote politics if it were at the expense of
law and order, efficiency and proficiency. The PLA sought to
preserve order and maintain the nation's strength. But at the
same time the PLA's power was increasing at the provincial and
local level. Decisions became more and more decentralized and
fell more often than not into the hands of the regional force
officers
.
While the military's response to the order to take over
administrative functions was positive, the army's response to
Mao's order to "support the left" was, at best, hesitant and
ambiguous, and at the worst, defiant. The revolutionary rebels
had been given authority by Mao to seize power from the Party
and state and to replace these structures with a new one - the
revolutionary committee. The PLA was to provide the radicals
with support and to intervene when they were unable to over-
come opposition by themselves. This task gave the PLA a life
or death influence over the new political organizations.
In most areas rival revolutionary rebel and Red Guard
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factions had appeared to challenge the radicals. Some of
them were composed of former cadres and the children of Party,
state and even military officers. The determination of which
faction was to receive support from the PLA fell to the
regional force officers. In many areas the PLA used its power
as arbitor between rival factions to suppress the most radical
groups and to legitimize the more conservative groups. Thus
the PLA in its designated role as supporters of the left were
often a force of restraint rather than an avant garde of the
left.
Amidst this political strife the formation of the new
revolutionary committees moved at a snails pace when it moved
at all. In the eight months of 1967 only six provinces formed
committees. These were Heilungkiang, Shantung, Kweichow and
Shansi provinces and Peking and Shanghai municipalities (the
latter two had the administrative status of provinces due to
their size). But even in these units the authority of the
radicals was often carefully circumscribed. Shantung Province
is an example. The Commander of the Tsinan Military Region
which is centered on Shantung was General Yang Te-chich. In
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response to the January directive to support the left,
General Yang immediately proclaimed that his units were .
.
prepared to support "with all might the Maoist struggle for the
seizure of power." Local forces joined revolutionary rebels in
the overthrow of the old provincial Party committee. But when
the new Revolutionary Committee was officially formed on
23 February, the PLA's First Political Commissar for Tsinan
Military Area was appointed chairman and General Yang himself
became First Vice-Chairman. The membership of the thirteen man
committee included eight former Party and state cadres, three
PLA officers and only two Maoist organization representatives.
In many other provinces the January order to support
the left was received an even less positive response and in
some it was ignored. Not even the first step toward committee
formation was taken in four provinces. The reaction of
commanders in the provinces to Maoist directions from Peking
during this period was measured by China-watchers through
response to a Peking-originated campaign to help farmers with
spring ploughing. ' The slogan for this campaign, in
accordance with the precepts of the Cultural Revolution, was
to be "Grasp Revolution! Promote Production!" There developed
an interesting ideological differentiation in the use of this
slogan by commanders in the provinces. The commanders in a
few provinces called for just such "Grasp Revolution! Promote





hold "Promote Production!" campaigns. Since the term "revo-
lution" served as a shibboleth for the Maoists, it seems
justified to assume that those commanders who did not use this
term had some differences in priorities and intended to keep
their distance from the Maoists. More ominous still for Mao
was the defiance shown by seven provinces in which no campaign
of any kind was instituted.
By mid April it was clear that the thrusting of the
military into the Cultural Revolution had not produced the
intended results. The Central Cultural Revolution Group
leadership was distressed to find its objectives thwarted by
the very "vanguard of the revolution" in China. Steps had to
be taken to correct this situation. Through the MAC the
Maoists issued a directive repeating the order to support the
left and severely restricting the PLA's ability to discipline
revolutionary rebels and Red Guards. Mass arrests and
firing on mass organizations was forbidden as was corporal
punishment. Provincial and garrison commanders were no longer
given authority to declare any mass organizations illegal. The
central leadership also removed twelve provincial and regional
commanders
.
In the provinces and the cities, the new attitude of the
Central Cultural Revolution leadership to the army was not long
in taking its toll. Revolutionary rebels and Red Guards
quickly recognized that the new directive signalled the
CO




extension of the revolution to the PLA. Maoists stormed and
invaded local PLA headquarters and seized arms and documents.
Officers were subjected to the interrogation sessions and
69harassments previously confined to Party and state cadres.
The developments of April 1967 were critical ones
effecting the course of the Cultural Revolution and the role
the military was to play in the future. There were two
contradictory results. First, as just described, the radicals
were encouraged to once again go on the offensive, this time
against the PLA. But the events of April 1967 also firmed the
loyalties and priorities of the PLA. It was clear to the PLA,
too, that it was now the target of the revolution. And it was
apparent that the central Defense Ministry leadership could not
be counted upon for support. The confusion and destruction
topped off by personal threats to their authority and lack of
support from the center led to an intransigence and determi-
nation and settling of priorities and loyalties which
undoubtedly influences attitudes up to the present time. The
PLA commanders were now determined to protect their own profes-
sional interests and authority.
Summer 1967
By the summer of 1967 it had become evident that the
theories of Mao on the correct role of the military in China no




priorities, its loyalties. The maintenance of law and order,
not the support of revolution was its self perceived task. Its
loyalties were to the established structure. Internal
stability as well as external security was its first priority.
The events of July, August and September were to confirm these
attitudes.
The most immediate manifestation of the hardening of
attitudes and determination to action on the part of the PLA
came with the Wuhan Incident of July. This extraordinary
event took place in the strategic industrial complex of
several cities on the Yangtze River known as Wuhan. Trouble
had been brewing in Wuhan for several months. Industrial
workers had been on strike and revolutionary rebels and
Red Guards were conducting political struggles on a large
scale. Since April over 2,400 factories and mines had
suspended production or dropped to less than half capacity.
Some 50,000 workers were said to be directly involved in armed
incidents of one sort or another. To cope with this situation,
General Chen Tsai-tao, head of the Wuhan Military Region, had
arrested some 10,000 persons and had intervened directly in the
struggle between two competing revolutionary factions.
Specifically, he had supported the conservative "One Million
Heroes" mass organization at the expense of the Peking leaning
rival "Three Command." These actions came finally to the
Thomas W. Robinson, "The Wuhan Incident-Local Strife
and Provincial Rebellion During the Cultural Revolution,"
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attention of the Central Cultural Revolutionary leadership.
Two emissaries were dispatched to Wuhan, one a member of the
Politburo and one a member of the Cultural Revolutionary-
Group, to admonish Chen and the region's Political Commissar
for supporting the conservatives and suppressing the revolu-
tionary faction. When they delivered their admonishment, local
military leaders were incensed over the lack of support from
Peking. After a particularly heated meeting, the two
emissaries, Hsieh and Wang, were kidnapped and beaten by
members of the "One Million Heroes" and by soldiers from a
local PLA unit. The same group sealed off the city by blocking
roads and bridges; seized the railway station, radio station
and the airport. Forays were made against the "Three Command"
faction.
This most defiant gesture yet by the military regional
forces brought an immediate response from the Maoist
leadership in Peking. The Wuhan Incident was perceived in
Peking as an act of mutiny and the decision was to deal with it
.firmly. Army corps and airborne units descended upon Wuhan.
Five gunboats from the East Sea Fleet were dispatched up the
river to Wuhan. (In Hong Kong amused Englishmen and Americans
referred to this as "Mao's Gun Boat Diplomacy".) The two
Peking emissaries were finally released, General Chen and his
supporters ousted and order restored under the control of








But the impact of the Wuhan Incident - its significance -
was not lost. The incident was an overt protest to the Peking
leadership. It served notice that the PLA regional forces
intended to resist those political decisions which ran counter
to their own priorities. And it brought to a head their
confrontation with the leaders of the Cultural Revolution.
These leaders - Mao, Madame Mao, Lin Piao and the ideologist
Chen Po-ta - then attacked the regional forces military
leadership directly in a final effort to keep the Cultural
Revolution from being halted or subverted by the PLA.
First came a series of verbal attacks. Madame Mao
called for the overthrow of the "handful of capitalist power-
holders in the army" and incited rebels to drag out the
72
"Chen Tsai-tao types" in the provinces. In early August,
Lin suggested that the Red Guards might "teach the cadres of
military regions, military districts and People's Armed
Departments who have made mistakes." And Lin issued a
blistering order to his commanders: "Our PLA cadre policy from
now on should be that whoever opposes Chairman Mao will be
discharged. Whoever does not give prominence to politics will
73be discharged. ..."
A program of arming the Red Guards was begun and the





Cultural Revolution Group issued a new slogan "drag out the
handful in the army." In response, the radicals began new
raids on military headquarters, seized weapons from soldiers
and warehouses; riots, fires and armed clashes between rebels
and troops became widespread. By mid August, public order in
many areas was in a shambles.
This led Mao to utilize his final trump card in the
revolution. The Party, the state and the regional forces were
already under attack and rendered incapable of use by Mao.
Now only the elite main forces remained intact and uncommitted.
It was decided to use these centrally controlled units to
supplant the intransigent regional forces.
The irony of this decision is inescapable. The elite
corps were the least politically indoctrinated, most profes-
sionally oriented organization in China. They, more than any
other group, had escaped the requirement for indoctrination in
Mao Tse-tung Thought. Now Mao counted upon them to support
him in the fight to wrest political power from the hands of the
well-indoctrinated regional forces, Party and state cadres.
The elite corps commanders were ordered to seize control
of several military districts and run them directly. They
were directed to establish revolutionary committees or
preparatory groups for revolutionary committees in those
provinces where such steps had not been taken. In provinces
.cs
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not taken over directly, the regional force officers were
stripped of much of their decision making authority. In some
places an authority vacuum occurred during the transition.
When a Red Guard organization in Canton attempted to report a
shooting incident to military district headquarters in August,
the telephone was not answered for over an hour. Finally, an
answerer reluctantly informed the Red Guard leaders that "the
military district is closed on Sundays"!
Almost immediately, the commitment of the main forces
produced results which the Maoists could least afford.
Dissidence broke out between the main force and regional force
units. Usually these struggles took the form of supporting
rival mass organizations but some armed clashes did occur.
There were a number of obvious causes of this factionalism.
The main forces had been sent to correct the "mistakes" made by
the regional forces. This naturally caused bad feeling. In
addition, the regional forces felt a natural resentment toward
the elite corps which had always enjoyed, as described earlier,
a larger budget, more promotion opportunities and more presti-
gious assignments. And finally, difficulties emerged because
of the political inexperience of the main force commanders.
Thrust into highly charged, highly complicated political






strategy and judgment. There was a tendency for them to support
rebel faction "A" because the previous regional forces organ-
ization had supported faction "B" thus making it obvious, the
main force commanders felt, that faction "A" must be the
faction which the central leadership would desire they support.
In wide areas the lack of cooperation for the "out-
siders" brought in by Peking led to serious stalemates in
which all functions normally performed by the Party, state and
army came to a complete halt. If the situation were allowed to
continue much longer soon no one would govern China.
While Mao is a dedicated revolutionary, he is also a
practical man. At this point he moved to halt the attack on
the PLA and to take steps which would allow order to be
restored and government to function once again. A meeting was
called in Peking attended by regional military commanders. A
series of steps were taken to personally molify the commanders
and to restore their prestige and authority.
To gain the cooperation of the regional commanders, who
were still rankled by the lack of support they had received
from the central leadership of the PLA, Lin Piao denounced the
General Political Department of the PLA and dismissed all of
78its senior members in Peking. ' To restore the PLA's prestige,
Peking launched a "support the army and love the people"
campaign. An editorial was printed in the People's Daily on






tarian dictatorship; and without the proletarian dictatorship
79
there would be no Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution."
Mao summed up the policy of healing wounds in the army:
The handful of persons within the Party taking the
capitalist road should not be lumped together with the
group of people taking the capitalist road in the
military. We should mention only the handful in the
Party and strive to make the military a success. . . . °0
Taking a personal hand in a campaign to restore confidence in
the PLA, Mao himself toured six provinces where disturbances
had occurred.
By September the PLA had also won authority to back up
its renewed prestige. A directive was issued on 5 September by
the Central Committee, the MAC and the Cultural Revolutionary
Group jointly authorizing the PLA to use force to quell any
81disobedience.
From this time forward the army slowly took control of
China
.
Fall 1967 to April 1969
What remained of the Cultural Revolution after
August 1967 was firmly under the control of the PLA. Through
the remainder of 1967, through all 1968 and until the Cultural
Revolution officially ended at the Ninth Party Congress in
April 1969, far reaching changes took place in China's political









system. The PLA enormously expanded its political role at the
cost of the Party and state. And provincial authorities,
dominated by the regional PLA commanders, acquired a
substantial degree of political autonomy vis-a-vis the central
leadership.
The PLA's entry into the functions normally dominated
by cadres of the state apparatus - in the economy, in the
judicial and police systems - has already been described. Now
the PLA consolidated its position in these functions. A high
priority was given to setting the wheels of the economy back in
8?
normal motion. In the fall of 1967, soldiers directed
collection of the harvest. The following spring, PLA units
mobilized the peasants to begin the spring planting. Units of
the Rear Services Department even helped to repair farm
machinery in an effort to get the agricultural sector back on
its feet.
The PLA fulfilled its expanded role as police force and
arbitor of justice with even more relish. Under the direction
of the PLA, mass trials were held as a means of control and
example. They were aimed at re-establishing order and disci-
pline. A mass trial of "counter revolutionaries" and
"criminal offenders" was reported by the Chinese press in
8 3Harbin in March 1968. It was held outdoors before a crowd
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of 150,000. The Military Affairs Committee of the local Public
Security Force pronounced the sentences at the conclusion of
the trial. At another mass trial at Nanchang, the press
reported that a PLA representative delivered a speech. At
executions, the PLA provided the firing squads. In harshly
cracking down on violence, disorders and crimes, the PLA often
worked with old civilian Party cadres whom the army had
"rehabilitated" after their purges earlier in the Cultural
Revolution.
Finally, the PLA in its role as policeman helped to
enforce a decision which went far in bringing a halt to the
Cultural Revolution. That was the decision to send literally
millions of students to the countryside. The factionalism,
aimless violence and personal ambitions of the Red Guards had
finally disillusioned Mao who became convinced that to gain the
revolutionary spirit necessary to be worthy successors, students
would have to engage in common labor like the peasant masses.
Also, their skills, he thought, would benefit the villages and
help to expand the settlement of the northern frontier. Most
students, however, looked down on farming and peasants. Most
expected their educations to provide a route of escape from
peasant labor to more prestigious assignments in state offices
or in Party posts in the cities.
In these circumstances, Mao issued a directive in
December 1968 which stated that, "It is very necessary for




by the poor and lower middle peasants." The PLA was to be in
charge of the program. One newspaper has reported that when
PLA units received this order they held "grand rallies and
8 5
celebrated all night." This reported jubilation was
officially supposed to have resulted from jubilation at
"receiving an order from Chairman Mao." But it must also have
reflected an element of sweet revenge on the part of soldiers
who had been forced to put up with the earlier excesses of the
arrogant Red Guard youths. In any case, the PLA promptly sent
out teams to mobilize the youngsters and provided chaperones and
transportation via the PLA-controlled railroads. In addition to
youths sent to countryside work with the peasants, some 60,000
college graduates were sent to work and be re-educated on PLA
farms. It is assumed that these were primarily political
activists who had particularly alienated the military.
With the removal from the cities of the student activists,
the leadership and hard core following of the Cultural Revolution
had been eliminated from areas where they could effectively
continue the activities of the Revolution. The PLA appeared now
to be on top of the violent manifestations of the Cultural
Revolution.
But the agressiveness with which the armed forces took







the participation of the PLA in the formation of the Revolu-
tionary Committees which were to replace the defunct state
apparatus and Party committees. In the six month period from
September 1967 through March 1968, twelve committees were
formed compared to only six committees in the first eight
86
months of 1967. More importantly, from an almost even
division of membership among cadres, mass organizations and
military on the earlier committees, now the military member-
ship increased to 53 percent, the cadres slipped to 25 percent
and the rebels dropped to 21 percent.
An example of the army's tactics in the formation of
87Revolutionary Committees is provided by Kansu Province.
During the first months of 1967, the PLA in Kansu gave no
response to the call to support the left. On the contrary, the
army expelled rebels who attempted to occupy a newspaper office
in April 1967. When a Red Guard organization was finally
supported by the PLA commanders in the summer, it was an organ-
ization which the commanders themselves had formed from four
separate groups. The Preparatory Group for committee formation
had, at the insistence of the Military Area Commander, "the
PLA garrison as its center." When the Revolutionary Committee
was established in January 1968, the PLA political commissar











mass organization representative and nine military officers.
The period from March 1968 to April 1969 saw the
formation of the remaining Revolutionary Committees. The
Peking leadership was anxious enough, by this time, for a
return to calm that orders were given to the regional
commanders to impose Revolutionary Committees where none could
be agreed upon by the participants in the Preparatory Groups.
Finally, with the Revolutionary Committee formation
completed, Mao and the leadership called a Party Congress, the
first in thirteen years. This Ninth Party Congress held in
April 1969 was to officially conclude the Cultural Revolution
by retroactively approving the events which had occurred, to
restore Party morale, to make preparations to build a new
Party apparatus and to ratify a new Party constitution. But
the Ninth Party Congress also served to confirm the most
unexpected and perhaps most significant political result of
the Cultural Revolution - the emergence of the PLA as the
dominant power structure in China.
The main speech of the Congress was delivered by
Defense Minister Lin Piao who was designated in the new consti-
tution as Mao's successor. Lin stressed the role of the
military and the role of the Revolutionary Committee as the
88
core of a rejuvenated Party. More importantly, the army was
conspicuously present at the Congress. The army strongly





Of the 279 members and alternate members, 44 percent (123)
were military representatives. Of the 123, eighty were
officers of the military region and military district commands
and 56 held appointments on their provincial Revolutionary
Committees concurrently with their military assignments. The
commanders of all military regions were members. The 25 new
members of the Politburo selected by the Central Committee,
too, showed a heavy increase in military representation. Over
fifty percent (13) of the membership was military and included
were three regional force commanders.
At the close of the Cultural Revolution, then, it
appeared that Lin Piao's dogmatic application of the theories
of Mao Tse-tung on the role of the military as active partic-
ipants in a continuing revolution had brought unexpected
results. The PLA had participated in the Cultural Revolution.
But the form of its participation seems to have been shaped by
priorities not entirely consistent with the theories of Mao.
Instead of revolution the PLA seemed to give priority to the
maintenance of stability. And its loyalty appears to have gone
to those who represented the bureaucratic system of which the
PLA had, since 1949, itself become a part.
While it is not the purpose of this paper to analyze the
influence of external events on internal Chinese politics,
considerations of perspective do require that mention be made





increasingly serious dispute with the Soviet Union. By-
January 1969, armed clashes had actually occurred on Damasky
Island on the northeast border. The PLA 1 s elite units - the
army corps, the Air Force and the Navy - responsible for
protection of China's border regions could not serve as
internal peace keepers and at the same time maintain the
readiness necessary in border areas during heightened tension.
While little documented information is available, undoubtedly
the increasing tension along the Sino-Soviet border during the
final year of the Cultural Revolution strengthened the polit-
ical hand of the PLA commanders whom Mao and the remaining
Chinese leadership had now to rely upon not only to replace
the almost non-existent Party and state apparatus and maintain
internal security but also to provide the muscle to the
Maoists' intensifying competition and contention with the
Soviet Union.
The army appeared, then, as the 1960s ended, to be in a
powerfully dominant position in China.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: 1970-1974
The question as China entered the 1970s was how the
military would use its vast power. Would China become - had it
already become - a military dictatorship? Or would the gun
once more fall back into the hands of the Party?
Few scholars of China have addressed the question of the
Chinese military's own perception of its role in Chinese
Communist society. Do the Chinese marshals dream of themselves
as warlords of their own military realms? Do they see them-
selves in Mao's vision as vanguards of a continuing revolution?
Or do they see themselves in more modern, conventional terms as
the professional keepers of law and order and the protectors of
the homeland?
The period following the Cultural Revolution would seem
to offer a fine opportunity to determine the PLA man's
conception of his role in the new China for circumstances now
offered him an unparalled opportunity to influence if not
dictate his own role. The Party was shattered and the state
apparatus was in disarray. And as pointed out in the previous
section what remained of the Chinese leadership was more
dependent than ever before upon the one societal structure left
in tact, the army. Moreover, the first two decades of its
existence had given the PLA a taste of two contrasting roles -
the conventional, professional role of the 1950s and the Maoist
ideology-oriented role of the 1960s.
whether the period turns out to be, indeed, a harbinger
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of the future or instead a mere transition period it has been a
time filled with tensions and drama. The sudden, unexpected
downfall of Lin Piao; the downplaying, or perhaps better, the
lowering of the PLA's profile; and the recent developments
involving the PLA which appear related to the struggle for
succession and the renewal of revolutionary struggle have all
raised speculation about the future role of the PLA and merit
a close inspection. But first it is necessary to set the
stage, to comprehend the almost overwhelming dominance of the
military in post-Cultural Revolutionary China.
The first two years following the Ninth Party Congress
of April 1969 seem to have been devoted to bringing about a
return to stability. The elite corps were removed from the
internal trouble areas and returned to the now increasingly
tense border areas, particularly in the north opposite the
Soviet Union. The regional forces were once again in charge
of the provinces.
In fact, the regional force commanders emerged from the
frays of the Cultural Revolution in a stronger position than
ever before. They controlled the Public Security Forces in
China thus exercising power over the only other organized
force remaining in the provinces which could challenge them.
And they stepped now with increasing confidence into political
and governmental roles. A prime example is the PLA regional
forces participation in the re- establishment of the Party
90
apparatus begun in 1970. Party committees were formed in all
90New York Times, 5 August 1971, p. 31.
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provinces between December 1970 and August 1971. Of the 158
individuals holding the ranks of first secretary, second
secretary or deputy secretary - the leadership positions - 95,
or sixty percent, were military officers; 53, or 35.5 percent
were Party/government cadres and a mere ten, or 6.4 percent,
were "mass" representatives. Of the 29 first secretaries, 21
were military men. The circle seemed now to be complete.
Before the Cultural Revolution, Party secretaries had often
served concurrently as first political commissars of military
units. Now local PLA commanders or political commissars
functioned as provincial Party secretaries.
At the same time that the regional commanders were
increasing their authority in the provinces they were apparently
increasing their influence in Peking. That is not to imply that
the regional commanders were in a position to dictate to the
Peking leadership. But it does appear that the relationship had
altered and now required a good deal of negotiation and
bargaining. And even then, response to policy decisions made
at the center was implemented as the regional commanders saw
fit. The rectification of the Party is a prime example. Mao
had decreed that the Party should conduct its reconstruction on
the basis of "getting rid of the stale and taking in the new"
91
and of an "open door" principle. The objective was to
permanently expel old Party cadres and infuse the Party with new
radical youths. The commanders, however, dragged their feet and
91Parris Chang, "Decentralization of Power," Problems of
Communism
,
No. 4, July-August 1972, p. 71.
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finally when new Party committees were formed they were over-
whelmingly dominated, as the figures above show, by the
military and the old cadres.
The role of the military in all facets of Chinese life
was so overwhelming that it was even apparent to American
visitors who began arriving in China in mid 1971. James Reston
reported in the New York Times that "You don't have to be in
92China long to feel the influence of the military officers."
wherever visitors went, whether to a factory, to a commune, to
a hospital or even to Peking University, they were introduced
to the Chairman of the Revolutionary Committee who more often
than not turned out to be a military officer. Reston, for
example, was startled to find that the "rector" of Peking
University was a PLA commander.
The significance of observations and indeed the ability
of foreign observers to deduce the real trend of events in the
closed society of Communist China is, unfortunately, highly
doubtful. No better example of this sad conclusion can be had
than the experience of the same correspondent Reston. In a
story from Peking dated 27 August 1971, Reston matter of factly
identified Lin Piao as Mao's successor and noted that Lin's
future seemed secured by the overwhelming role that he and the
93army already obviously played in China. Less than three





weeks later Lin Piao was to flee China, branded as a traitor to
Mao Tse-tung and the revolution.
The dramatic case of Lin Piao deserves special attention
for a number of reasons. As just pointed out, it dramatizes our
sad lack of intelligence about the internal politics of China
and the trend of events in that country. Second, the demise of
Lin Piao revealed in the course of time the continuing sharp
divisions within the Chinese leadership. Finally, and most
relevant to this paper, the case of Lin Piao offers the best
example yet of the predicament inherent in the role of a
military figure who must, by virtue of the system, become
involved in politics as well as professional matters.
At first glance, Lin Piao bore a rather striking simi-
larity to his predecessor as defense minister, Peng Te-huai.
Like Peng, Lin had built his reputation as a military hero.
Like Peng, Lin appeared uncomfortable and ill suited to the role
of political figure. And finally, like Peng, Lin was to become
the victim of his participation in political affairs. The
irony of Lin, however, is that in contrast to Marshal Peng, Lin
was the principal advocate within the PLA for the participation
of the army in government and politics.
A brief review of Lin's remarkable twelve years as
Defense Minister reveals the emphasis he placed upon the polit-
ical role of the military. Among Lin's actions, already
described, were a detailed program for political and ideological
work in the PLA spelled out in 1960, a massive recruitment
program for Party members, regulations formalizing the elevated
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status of the commissar vis-a-vis the military commander,
abolishment of the system of ranks and insignia for officers
and cooperation between the military and the civilian popu-
lation. Lin also took up his pen to emphasize his support for
Mao's concept of a revolutionary army. His 1965 pamphlet,
"Long Live People's Revolutionary War" praised Mao's theories.
Finally, during the crises of July 1967, Lin had sided with Mao
and against the recalcitrant PLA commanders. It will be
remembered he ordered: "Our PLA cadre policy from now on
should be that whoever opposes Chairman Mao will be discharged,
whoever does not give prominence to politics will be
discharged. ..."
Explaining Lin's demise has been a most delicate polit-
ical problem for the Chinese precisely because of his impec-
cable credentials as Mao's successor. To expose as a traitor,
the man designated in the constitution as the nation's next
leader is no small problem. Consequently, the official
explanations of the events which led to Lin's demise must be
accepted as having a political function. They must serve to
establish Lin Piao as a "villain" sufficiently dastardly to
deserve his ultimate fate.
There have been three "official" Chinese explanations of
what has come to be called, even in China, the Lin Piao Affair.
The first explanation was contained in a document dated
13 January 1972 and circulated to officials throughout China.
The second source was Mao Tse-tung himself in a conversation
with foreign visitors in July 1972. The latest explanation was
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given in the form of a report to the Tenth Party Congress
which met in August 1973.
The document of 13 January 1972 was sent to officials
of the PLA, the Party and state after rumors had circulated
throughout the country since the early fall of 1971 concerning
the strange prolonged absence of the Defense Minister, the
Chief of Staff and other high officials of the PLA. This
document alleged that Lin, his wife, son and several high
officials planned to remove Mao as leader, hoping to force him
to accept their terms but prepared to use "poison gas,
bombings, car accidents, germ weapons, assassination,
kidnapping . . ."if necessary. Named as co-conspirator in
the attempted coup was Chen Po-ta, Mao's secretary and a
leader with Mao, Madame Mao and Lin in the Cultural Revolution.
Mao was said to have had a falling out with Lin and Chen after
the second plenary session of the Ninth Congress held in
August-September 1970. The plotters' differences with Mao were
alleged to stem from their opposition to steps taken to ease
tensions in China after the Cultural Revolution.
As evidence of a plot to stage a coup, excerpts quoting
from letters allegedly written by Lin Piao were included in the
circulated document. "If we do not seize the revolutionary
leadership, the leadership will fall into other hands," Lin is
supposed to have written to a fellow plotter. Surprisingly,
94New York Times
,
18 October 1971, p. 9
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the document quoted a devastating critique of Mao the Politician.
At no time has B-52 (code name for Mao) stopped trying
to pit one force against another. Today he may try to
win over this force to deal with that, but tomorrow he
may pit that force against this. . . . Looking back over
past decades, how many do you see who were raised to
power and fame by him but later escaped political death?
What political force could survive coexistence with him?
Mao's description of Lin's fall from grace was given the
following summer to two separate visitors, the French foreign
minister and the prime minister of Ceylon. The explanation was
obviously offered as one most suitable to foreign visitors as
the earlier document had been intended to paint Lin in most
incriminating terms to Chinese officials. Lin, Mao explained,
was plotting to assassinate him as part of a conspiracy to
replace the civilian leadership of China with a military
95dictatorship. Lin had broken ranks with the rest of the
leadership over a number of policy issues including the decision
to seek normalization of relations with the United States and
the move to rebuild the Party. Mao dated the beginning of the
assassination conspiracy to December 1970 which was shortly
after election of the first Party committee. When the attempt
failed, Lin and his followers tried to escape to the Soviet
Union and died when their plane crashed, Mao claimed.
The most recent explanation of the Lin Piao Affair was
given to the Tenth Party Congress held last year, at which time
the paragraph officially naming Lin as Mao's heir was stricken




, 28 July 1972, p. 1.
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serious doubts must have been raised about the earlier
explanation which focused on policy differences between Mao and
Lin. Now it was asserted that Lin was motivated by a long time
thirst for power. Lin was described to the Congress as a
"most enthusiastic supporter of the Cultural Revolution
because it enabled him to eliminate a very serious rival for
power - Liu Shao-chi." ' After removing Liu as a contender,
the latest account alleges, Lin then turned his attention to
his remaining serious rival, Premier Chou En-lai. But
Chairman Mao came to Chou's defense. Mao, with his usual
perceptivity, is credited with suspecting Lin as early as
July 1966 but "could not afford open confrontation with Lin
before the dust of the Cultural Revolution had settled in view
of the key role played by the army." The confrontation
finally broke into the open at a Central Committee meeting in
the fall of 1970 when Yeh Chun, Lin's wife, proposed that Lin
be appointed chief of state. Mao opposed this and delivered a
strong criticism of Lin for his impatience.
Lin is then supposed to have turned into a "classical,
feudal type conspirator." When Mao was returning to Peking by
train on the night of 12 September 1971 after a tour of
military bases, an assassination attempt took place. Mao
escaped through a comic opera series of near disasters described
in detail in the report. The flight of Lin, alleged to have




, 2 September 1973.
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described in comic opera style.
What the Chinese - cadres, soldiers, students, peasants
- make of this latest explanation is not known. What is
known is that previous explanations have been received with
unease and some scepticism. The continuing, ongoing campaign
against Lin Piao presently being waged seems additional proof
of that conclusion.
Viewing Lin Piao's fall from power from the perspective
of the PLA, a few points bear consideration. The only PLA
officials linked directly to the plot against Mao are those
said to have died with Lin in the plane crash. They were the
Chief of Staff, the Commander of the Air Force, the First
Political Commissar of the Navy and the director of the General
Logistics Department. All had long personal ties to Lin Piao.
And all were in the central Peking leadership of the PLA.
Purges which took place in the army afterward - and which can
be linked in any way to the Lin Piao Affair - occurred for the
most part in the central leadership and all involved officers
with personal ties to Lin Piao. No evidence is available to
link any officers outside Lin's own personal coterie to the
alleged conspiracy of 1971. Indeed apparently no one in the
army lifted a hand to help Lin and his friends at the time of
their alleged escape attempt.
A theory which links Lin Piao's fall from power to the
PLA commanders is pure conjecture. However, it could be
asserted on the basis of evidence already summoned that the
commanders had scant reason to support Lin Piao when he had
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allowed them to come under attack during the Cultural Revo-
lution. And they had since 1969 been able to exert consid-
erable political clout in dealing with their earlier opponents:
the fall from power of Chen Po-ta and diminished role of
Madam Mao in 1970 were said to have been accomplished at the
behest of the commanders.
The cause of Lin's fall from power may have been a clash
over policies; Mao's paranoia over possible rivals (as
suggested in the Lin letters); the plotting of conservative
opponents in the Party, state and army; or, most likely, a
combination of all three. Whatever the precise cause and
scenario of the Lin Piao Affair, Lin appears above all to have
been a victim of his own insistence on following the philosophy
of military-political involvement.
After the purge of Lin, the Chinese leadership began a
nation-wide campaign to downgrade the role of the military in
non-military affairs and to reassert the old Maoist principle
that the Party controls the gun. As a part of this campaign,
Mao's role as leader of the army was given new prominence.
"Chairman Mao is in command of our glorious army." And it
was emphasized that this leadership derived from Mao's role as
Party leader. Chinese broadcasts and articles stressed that
the local Party committees and the central Party leadership
controlled the armed forces.
There is no evidence that the PLA resisted this new
Ibid
.
, 2 August 1972.
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trend toward a reduction of its role in non-military activ-
ities. Many officers were apparently concerned that the
involvement of the PLA in the economy, in the schools, in the
security forces, etc. had overextended the army at the expense
of combat readiness. And the primary responsibility of the PLA
commanders remained, after all, national defense.
While the role of the PLA diminished, then, in non-
military affairs which took time away from combat training,
there is less evidence that the commanders relinquished much of
their political clout. While it was emphasized that control of
the armed forces lay in the hands of the Party, it should be
remembered that with the formation of the new Party committees
in 1970, most of the Party committees lay in the hands of the
commanders (see page 63). The military representation at the
recent Tenth Party Congress indicates that the regional force
commanders continued to hold power in the provinces. The PLA's
membership in the Central Committee had shrunk from 127 to
98100. However, almost all of this reduction is accounted for
by the purge of Lin Piao supporters at the center and a few Lin
loyalists in the provinces. All eleven military region
commanders continued to sit on the Central Committee. The same
pattern occurs in the 25 member Politburo. PLA representation
had dropped from thirteen to seven. But the reduction is
accounted for by Lin and his apparent accomplices in the central
leadership.
98 Ibid., 2 September 1973,
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Events of the past year in China, in so far as they
effect the PLA, reflect the continued unsettled state of
internal political affairs. The purge of Lin Piao left China
without a designated successor to Mao Tse-tung. This has led
to much jockeying for position among the various groups in China
which maintain some political power. And it has led Mao to once
again express concern about the perpetuation of the revolution
in China after his departure and has apparently precipitated a
move by him to begin a second Cultural Revolution.
These developments have had ramifications within the
PLA. Since the purge of Lin and his staff, the PLA has been
without a defense minister, a chief of staff, a commander of the
air force and a political commissar of the navy. It had been
expected that appointments to these posts would be settled prior
to convening of the Tenth Party Congress and approved by that
99group but none were forthcoming. This failure is due to the
continuing split in the leadership. It has of course the effect
of re-enforcing the power of the regional force officers who are
answerable to no strong central military leadership and must be
dealt with by the center Party leadership.
In addition to the power struggle - which the Chinese
have publicly acknowledged - the renewal of the Cultural Revo-
lution was announced at the Tenth Party Congress and has also
effected affairs in the PLA. While the initial months of this





disruption of the first, there has apparently been resistance.
There have been two manifestations which indicate
resistance in the PLA to this renewal of political struggle.
First, steps were taken in the late summer of 1973 to activate
an urban militia force. There has been much speculation over
the intended use of this urban militia force. The official
reason given for its activization is preparedness for the
possibility of a Soviet attack. However, there is also specu-
lation that it may have a political motive. This urban militia
force is seen as a warning to the regional commanders not to
attempt to oppose decisions which may be taken by the center
Party leadership concerning either the succession or renewal of
the Cultural Revolution. Should the military attempt to
interfere, so the reasoning goes, the leadership could use the
militia as a counter force to the PLA. If this sounds a bit far
fetched, the scene at Lushan should be recalled. In his famous
showdown with Marshal Peng, Mao had threatened to recruit a new
army should the commanders oppose him. Consequently, it is
conceivable that Mao and the radicals in the leadership might
intend the new urban militia as a counter force to the PLA in
any showdown over policy or succession. (While a token militia
force already existed, it is primarily peasant based. The urban
worker is considered more politically active and less reluctant
to oppose the army than the more conservative peasants.)
The renewal of the Cultural Revolution also appears
1Q0Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 20 December 1973, p. 13.
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related to the dramatic news of January 1974 that all military-
regions had been assigned new commanders with the incumbents
transferred to a new regional command. It might logically
be supposed that the commanders opposed the renewal of the
struggles which had been so disruptive to China in the 1960s.
They had, after all, been responsible for stopping the first
Cultural Revolution.
While none of the regional commanders appears to have
been purged, reassignment may be as successful in stunting their
power to oppose renewal of the Cultural Revolution. Much of the
power of the regional commanders has come from their long asso-
ciation with the region over which they had command. The
Chinese have never had a tradition of transferring military
personnel from region to region, hence commanders have been
able to build up strong power bases. For example, General
Hsu Shih-yu had served as commander of the Nanking Military
102Region since the establishment of the People's Republic.
Many of his subordinates had remained in Nanking with him
throughout this period. His removal to Canton as commander of
that military region may have effectively neutralized his polit-
ical power for some time (particularly since poor Hsu speaks no
Cantonese)
.
The long term significance of the recent transfers of
New York Times
.




regional force commanders is still uncertain. In the short
term it has undoubtedly allowed the radicals to commence the
new Cultural Revolution. But this is probably only the first
battle in what most people expect to be a protracted struggle
in China over leadership and the direction China will take in
the future
.
If the commanders' political power has been reduced by
recent events, it is still difficult to see how the PLA could
be left out of any decision on the succession and China's
future. The PLA continues to be the strongest, the most disci-
plined power structure in China today. It represents to a
large extent still, the interests of the provinces. And the
recent Party Congress has given ample evidence of the
continuing weakness created at the center by the struggle for
power.
There is today a sense of unease both inside and out-
side China concerning developments in that giant country. This
unease is heightened by the leadership's own acknowledgement
that many decisions remain unsettled, including issues of
leadership, foreign and domestic policy. Perhaps what frightens
most however is the deliberate choice of the Chinese not to
build strong institutions and hence not to institutionalize
decision making in their society. This, more than anything
else, leads one to conclude in 1974 that the armed forces - the
one strong institution - remain by necessity a powerful force
in China's government and politics.

CONCLUSION
It was suggested earlier in this paper that drawing
conclusions from events which have or are taking place in China
is a risky business. China watchers have come to expect the
unexpected. Having said that, it does seem possible to discern
some trends or patterns emerging from the past 24 years which
may help to place in perspective the themes upon which this
paper sought to focus.
The role of the army in China has been played against a
back drop of continuing revolutionary struggle primarily
fostered by Mao Tse-tung. Mao has always believed that true
revolution would come to China only if it were a continuous
process carried out over decades, possibly hundreds of years.
If this process were to stop, what had already been won might be
lost. China might revert back into an elitist, capitalist
society. Mao saw this continuing struggle based upon contra-
dictions; foremost among these contradictions in the past 24
years has been that between Maoist and bureaucratic styles of
governing. The struggle between these two basic philosophies of
how China should be run has been variously described in such
terms as ideological versus professional, red versus expert,
men versus machines, politics versus technology, leadership
versus organization, etc. The role of the PLA can only be
properly evaluated in terms of this setting and this paper has
attempted to trace the role of the PLA through the ebb and flow
of this continuing struggle.
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In this setting what evaluation can then be made of the
influence of Mao's philosophy on the course of the military
since the revolution? What evaluation can be made of its
relevance? To the extent that the army has participated in
government and politics Mao's philosophy can be said to have
been influential for it has been his intent that the army
participate. Mao's influence over the army, however, as over
all aspects of Chinese life, has ebbed and flowed since 1949.
It reached its nadir, perhaps, in the mid-1950s as the PLA set
about transforming itself into a conventional military force
led by a professional officer corps. Since the late 1950s the
army's participation in government and politics has steadily
increased.
However, the nature of the army's participation does
not seem to have conformed to Mao's vision and it is this
nature of the army's participation which calls into question
the relevance of Mao's philosophy. The army has participated
in government and politics within the framework of its self
perceived priorities and loyalties; it has not participated as
the vanguard of a continuing revolution as Mao had envisioned.
It has not championed the ideological, the political side of
the contradiction. The army has not served this purpose, this
paper suggests, because it could not. To expect the army to
foster revolution in a post revolutionary society may represent
a contradiction in itself. The Red Army won victory in 1949.
It did this in the name of the Communist Party and the new
Communist state. It is the organizational structure of the
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state, the Party and the army itself - the institutional
structure of the nation - which gives the army legitimacy. To
expect an army to act as a force to destroy that which it has
created and that which gives it legitimacy would seem to ask
the impossible. The Maoist theories which were designed to
exploit the revolutionary role of the Red Army no longer appear
to be relevant to the institutionalized post-revolutionary PLA.
If the participation of the army in politics and
government has been upon its own terms - based upon the
loyalties and priorities which the army has developed - what
are these loyalties and priorities? If the past two and one-
half decades are any guide, the army's priorities are stability
and security. Internal stability and external security. Its
loyalties have been to the established structures of the Party,
state and army. The events of the greatest crisis in the
short history of the People's Republic, the Great Cultural
Revolution, provide the evidence to support this conclusion.
Called upon to lead the revolution, the army instead through
its role in politics and government served as a force of
restraint rather than as an avant garde. In its governmental
functions, the army emphasized maintenance of law and order and
protection of the country's economy. Its participation in
politics served to demonstrate its loyalty to the established
structure as the army sought to protect the technicians and
cadres who form the backbone of the Party and state. And above
all, the army sought to protect its own authority. The experi-
ence of the Cultural Revolution and its aftermath seem to have
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served to further firm these same loyalties and priorities.
Finally, to what extent has the army played a part in
government and politics and to what extent is it likely to
continue to play a role? To what extent has the military role
of the PLA officer affected - and likely to affect in the
future - his role and influence in government and politics?
The experience of the two most prominent military officers in
post- revolutionary China support the view that so long as a
military officer maintains his military post his political and
governmental responsibilities will be affected by his military
responsibilities. His position on state and Party issues will
be influenced by his priorities and loyalties as a military
officer. To deny these priorities and loyalties may be to
sacrifice the base of support which has provided the basis for
the military officer's authority. In short, it appears
inevitable that the commanders of the PLA who will carry the
mantle of leadership in the future will share the dilemma of
their predecessors, that is, how to fulfill the oftentimes
contradictory roles of military officer, politician and states-
man. It will not be easy.
The army's participation in government and politics can
be linked to the ebb and flow of the revolutionary struggle.
When other institutions have been under attack or weakened as
in the Cultural Revolution and its aftermath, the army has
served to fill the vacuum. When the other institutions of
China have shown vitality the army's role has ebbed. As to the
future, James Townsend in his recent book Politics in China,
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anticipating struggles over succession and policies, warns
that, "We may not yet have seen the last of revolutionary
struggle in modern China." If that is the case, if the other
institutional structures of China remain weak and subject to
attack and change, then experience of the past would suggest
that the People's Liberation Army will continue to play an
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